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part of the paper, we develop an account of felicitous insensitive
assessments by identifying a number of pragmatic factors that influence the felicity of assessments. Before closing, we argue that
the role of these factors extends beyond cases considered in the
debate about assessor-relativism and fits comfortably with standard contextualist analyses of the relevant locutions.
1. INTRODUCTION

GUNNAR BJÖRNSSON
Department of Culture and Communication, Linköping University
Department of Philosophy, Linguistics, and Theory of Science,
University of Gothenburg

ALEXANDER ALMÉR
Department of Applied Information Technology, Chalmers, University
of Gothenburg

THE PRAGMATICS OF INSENSITIVE
ASSESSMENTS
Understanding The Relativity of Assessments of Judgments of Personal
Taste, Epistemic Modals, and More1

ABSTRACT: In assessing the veridicality of utterances, we normally seem to assess the satisfaction of conditions that the speaker
had been concerned to get right in making the utterance. However, the debate about assessor-relativism about epistemic modals,
predicates of taste, gradable adjectives and conditionals has been
largely driven by cases in which seemingly felicitous assessments
of utterances are insensitive to aspects of the context of utterance
that were highly relevant to the speaker’s choice of words.
In this paper, we offer an explanation of why certain locutions invite insensitive assessments, focusing primarily on ‘tasty’
and ‘might’. We spell out some reasons why felicitous insensitive
assessments are puzzling and argue briefly that recent attempts
to accommodate such assessments (including attempts by John
MacFarlane, Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies) all fail to provide more than hints at a solution to the puzzle. In the main

Natural language contains a wide range of phrases dedicated to expressing agreement or disagreement with beliefs and utterances, and
assessments of their veridicality: ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘that is true’, ‘that is false’,
‘he is wrong about that’, ‘she is mistaken’, ‘I agree’, ‘I disagree’, ‘she
knows that’, ‘that is not the case’, ‘I take that back’, and so forth.
When we assess utterances using such assessment phrases, we normally (barring misunderstanding, etc) seem to assess whether the propositions that the utterer had been concerned to get across are satisfied. In
many cases, this means being sensitive to the context of utterance and
the communicative interests of the utterer. This seems especially true
for utterances involving paradigmatically context-dependent expressions like pronouns, indexicals, demonstratives and definite descriptions, but also for expressions like ‘right / left’ and gradable adjectives
like ‘tall’, ‘rich’ and ‘dirty’, and might well extend in a potentially openended manner. If we want to assess whether Xena was correct when
she told Zac,
(1) They live in the first big building to the right of the cathedral.
we need a rich understanding of the context to figure out what Xena
referred to by ‘they’, what counts as a ‘big’ building, relative to what
perspective we should understand ‘right’ and what cathedral is meant.
Conversely, Xena is interested in communicating that certain conditions
hold, and interested in using an expression that will communicate just
that in the context of utterance. There is thus a convergence of speaker
and assessor interests: in making her utterance, Xena wants to get
across that certain conditions obtain, and as assessors of the truth of
what has been said, we want to determine whether those conditions do
indeed obtain.
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Though convergence of speaker and assessor concerns might be
the typical case, the debate about so-called assessor-relativism about expressions like epistemic and deontic modals, predicates of taste, graded
adjectives and conditionals has been largely driven by cases in which
seemingly felicitous assessments of beliefs or utterances are strikingly
insensitive to considerations that were understood as relevant for the
formation of the belief, or to aspects of the context of utterance that
were highly relevant to the speaker’s choice of words. For example,
when one speaker, A, has said that something is tasty, meaning to express that it accords with his taste, it might be appropriate for B to
reply, ‘No, it is too salty’, based on the fact that B dislikes its salty taste,
without regard to whether it accords with A’s taste. In such cases, the
assessment is insensitive to A’s standard of taste, insensitive to what
A was concerned to get right when judging that the dish is tasty, and
insensitive to the condition he hoped to convey by his utterance.
Our main objective in this paper is to offer an explanation of why
certain locutions and conversational contexts invite or require such insensitive assessments. In sections 2 and 3, we will provide examples
of felicitous insensitive assessments of subjective taste-claims and epistemically modal claims, briefly arguing against attempts to show that
assessments in these types of examples are either infelicitous or sensitive to speaker concerns. In section 4, we spell out some of the reasons
that felicitous insensitive assessments are puzzling. In section 5, we
look at three recent attempts to accommodate insensitive assessments:
the appeal to assessor-relative truth made popular by John MacFarlane
and others, an appeal to pragmatic under-determination of propositional content recently proposed by Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies,
and our own favourite approach, which takes the pragmatics of acts of
assessment to provide the requisite theoretical space. We argue that
all three fail to provide more than hints at satisfying explanations. In
sections 6 through 13, we develop our account of felicitous insensitive assessments by identifying a number of factors that influence the
pragmatics of assessments, focusing in turn on subjective taste-claims,
epistemic modals, ought-claims, indicative conditionals and gradable
adjectives. In section 14, finally we argue that the explanations that
we have provided mesh most comfortably with our own approach, and
briefly discuss some standard objections.

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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A terminological clarification: ‘conditions’, as we use the term, are
satisfied or obtain absolutely, not relative to some parameter or other,
and ‘propositions’ correspondingly signifies bearers of absolute truth
values. They thus correspond to what François Recanati (2007), following Barwise and Etchemendy, calls ‘Austinian propositions’, or to
propositions at times and worlds in Kaplanesque semantics.
2. FELICITOUS INSENSITIVE ASSESSMENTS OF SUBJECTIVE
TASTE-CLAIMS

To ask whether something is tasty, it seems, is to ask whether it accords with some relevant standard of taste. In most cases, the relevant
standard is that of oneself: when we search the fridge for something
tasty, we are typically searching for something that accords with our
own palate. At other times, however, we might be concerned to find
something that is tasty for those with a different palate, or for a group
of people: a parent might ask whether something is tasty for their toddler, and whether he likes fish or not, a waiter might inform us that if
we like fish, the main course is delicious. These concerns of judges of
taste and of people communicating that something is tasty seem to be
captured in the following (partial) analysis of ‘tasty’, which makes the
truth-conditions of taste-claims dependent on features of the context
of utterance:2
TASTY-C: An utterance of a sentence of the form X is tasty
is true if and only if X accords with the standard of taste
that is relevant in the context of utterance (cf. Glanzberg
2007; Schaffer 2011).
Correspondingly, it is tempting to say that beliefs that X is tasty always
relate X to some standard of taste and are true if and only if X accords
with that standard. Similar analyses seem tempting for ‘disgusting’,
‘delicious’ and other predicates of taste and corresponding beliefs.
Our main interest in this section, however, is not to argue for an
analysis of ‘tasty’, but to identify the concerns of judges and speakers
that seem to govern what judgments and utterances they make, and to
describe how these relate to concerns that drive explicit assessments of
these utterances and judgments. Here is one example that we take to
illustrate felicitous insensitive assessments of taste-judgments:
Vol. 6: Formal Semantics and Pragmatics: Discourse, Context, and Models
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Fish Sticks: At the family dining table, Eduardo has just had a second
serving of fish sticks. With his mouth stuffed, he happily exclaims:
(2) They are really tasty!
Here are three possible comments by his sister, Felicia:
(3) No, they are too bland. Can we please have the other kind next
time?
(4) Yes, they are super tasty. Can I have some more too?
(5) ? Yes, you are right. But I don’t like them; they are too bland.
The first two replies look natural, whereas the third seems defective,
almost contradictory. However, it is natural to assume that Eduardo
volunteered because he thought that the fish sticks would accord with
his palate (not with the palates of other people), and it is natural to
assume that he wanted to communicate this thought. It is also natural
to assume that if Felicia uttered (3), the assessment that she expressed
would be based on the fact that she found the fish sticks too bland.
The seemingly felicitous assessment expressed by ‘no’ in (3) is thus insensitive to Eduardo’s concerns. Moreover, it is natural to assume that
the positive and seemingly felicitous assessment in (4) was based on
whether the fish sticks accorded with Felicia’s palate, not on whether
it accorded with the palates of others. Similarly, the reason that ‘yes’
in (5) seems unnatural is that it is followed by Felicia’s claim that she
does not like the fish sticks; the fact that Eduardo most likely got right
what he hoped to get right does not seem to support the affirmative
assessment.
Insensitive assessments about taste-judgments might also take the
form of retractions. Looking at a film clip documenting the dinner conversation, the grown Eduardo who no longer fancies fish sticks might
naturally comment on (2) by saying ‘I take that back; I no longer fancy
fish sticks’, but would much less naturally say ‘I was right, but I no
longer like fish sticks’.3
It is worth mentioning that not all assessment phrases seem equally
suitable for insensitive assessments. Many would find the following
reactions to Eduardo’s (2) inappropriate, unless said in jest:

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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(6) ? That’s false. They are too bland.
(7) ? He is mistaken. They are too bland.
Later on, we will propose an explanation of the difference between (3)
on the one hand and (6) and (7) on the other.4
As we have noted, the existence of felicitous insensitive assessments
is somewhat contentious. For example, Herman Cappelen and John
Hawthorne (2009: 110–111, 117–118, e.g.) argue that much of our
sense that there is disagreement between people with different sensibilities concerning what is disgusting is based on a na?ve chauvinism:
when we reflect sufficiently on various possible sources of error and
explanations of our different sensibilities, we often see that the parties
are not really in disagreement. But while it is true that there are elements of chauvinism involved in some perceived disagreements, we
don’t think that there need be any chauvinism involved in the sort of
case we have looked at here.
One might also suggest that Eduardo meant his judgment to relate
the fish sticks to some collectively embraced standard of taste rather
than just his own. It is extremely plausible that this is our concern
when we make taste-judgments by way of recommending a restaurant
or a course to others. If this were Eduardo’s concern, and if his recommendation was directed at a group including Felicia, Felicia could
sensitively reject Eduardo’s claim based on the fact that she found them
too bland. But this interpretation of Fish Sticks seems unnatural, and
the example can be modified to rule it out. First, the example seems to
work well in a context where Eduardo already knows that some or even
all other family members dislike fish sticks. Second, if Felicia is understood as rejecting the collective claim in (3), her own claim that the
fish sticks are too bland cannot plausibly relate to the same standard,
as she has every reason to think that they are not bland by Eduardo’s
standard. Nevertheless, Eduardo could naturally respond to (3) with
‘No, they are not bland at all. They’re yummy!’ At that point, we would
again have an example of a felicitous insensitive assessment, this time
in relation to ‘too bland’.
A different kind of objection, pressed by Jonathan Schaffer (2011,
§4.1), notes that if Felicia responds to Eduardo’s (2) with
(8) No, they are not tasty. They are too bland.
Vol. 6: Formal Semantics and Pragmatics: Discourse, Context, and Models
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Eduardo can retort
(9) I didn’t say that you would like them. I just said that I like them.
But if Eduardo’s retort is felicitous, that seems to reveal that Felicia’s
insensitive assessment is infelicitous. However, (9) seems considerably less natural as a response to (3), the point of which seems to be
to express Felicia’s subjective taste-judgment, perhaps in order to affect
future purchases, than to (8), which is more naturally understood as directing criticism at Eduardo’s judgment. This suggests that subtle pragmatic issues involving a wide range of parameters determine whether
insensitive assessments are appropriate or not, but it does nothing to
show that there are no felicitous insensitive assessments. (In section
9, we offer an explanation of why criticism or accusatory connotations
undermine insensitive assessments.)
3. FELICITOUS INSENSITIVE ASSESSMENTS OF EPISTEMIC MODALS

In this section we turn to epistemic modals, and more specifically claims
and judgments to the effect that something might be the case, and argue that they are subject to felicitous insensitive assessments, just like
taste-claims.
The central cognitive role of might-judgments seems to be to guide
strategies under conditions of uncertainty. When we think that something might be the case, we are disposed to plan for the contingency
that it is indeed the case or to invest resources into finding out whether
it is the case. Normally, such strategies are guided by what we can
and cannot rule out given the information accessible to us at the time,
and on most occasions that also seems to be what guides our mightjudgments: we take it that P might be the case insofar as we take P
to be compatible with information accessible to us at the time (with
different standards of accessibility in different contexts). When the
gambler considers whether the next card might be an ace, she seems
to be asking whether she knows anything that rules out that it is an ace
or can gain access to such knowledge (within the rules of the game).
Sometimes, though, our might-judgments relate to other bodies of information. On such occasions, they are sometimes expressed with explicit relativizers, as when we say that ‘for all he knows, we might still
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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be at the airport’, but context can often make clear what the relevant
body of information might be. Particularly interesting are cases where
might-judgments relate to information possessed by some collective,
perhaps made up by the speaker and her interlocutors. The following
sort of analysis of might-claims seems to adequately capture the variety of concerns that we have when we want to convey judgments to
the effect that something might be the case:
MIGHT-C: An utterance of a sentence of the form P might be
the case is true if and only if P is compatible with the body
of information that is relevant in the context of utterance
(cf. DeRose 1991, 1998; Bach 2011; Schaffer 2011; Dowell
2011).5
Again, if this is right it would seem equally plausible that beliefs that
P might be the case always relate to some body of information and are
true if and only if P is compatible with that body.
Like our examples of felicitous insensitive assessments of tasteclaims, the following example involving might-claims is meant to be
one where speaker intentions are publicly accessible and relevant to
what is at issue in the context:
Lost Keys: Beth, who came home from the grocery store only a few
minutes ago, asks Alice whether she has seen Beth’s keys. Alice, remembering that Beth forgot the keys in the car last week when she
came home from the store, answers:
(10) They might be in the car.
Beth in turn replies with either of the following:
(11) No, they can’t be. I still had them when I came in.
(12) Yes, you are right. I’ll go check.
Both Alice’s answer and Beth’s possible replies (11) and (12) seem natural enough. At the same time, reflection suggests that the assessments
they expressed are insensitive to what Alice was concerned to get right
when replying to Beth’s question.6
It is natural to assume, we think, that Alice’s ground for saying
what she said was that the keys being in the car was compatible with
Vol. 6: Formal Semantics and Pragmatics: Discourse, Context, and Models
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information readily available to her at the time. First, she would be
warranted in thinking this. Since Beth had forgotten her keys in the
car before, the keys being in the car was not ruled out by any impeccable habits of Beth’s. Second, it seems unlikely that Alice would have
any strong reason to either conclude or rule out that Beth remembered
bringing the keys this time. Given these two conditions, it seems unlikely that Alice would be concerned to assert a proposition implying
that Beth did not remember bringing the keys, such as the proposition
that the keys being in the car is compatible with the set of information
available to either Beth or Alice. This suggests that Alice’s utterance of
(10) was based on a ‘solipsistic’ body of information.
Given this solipsistic understanding of Alice’s concerns in uttering
(10), Beth is insensitive to these concerns if she accepts or rejects the
utterance based on whether she herself has information ruling out that
the keys are in the car. But this is exactly the sort of consideration that
we naturally take to ground her assessments in (11) and (12) given the
sentences following the assessments. Since both (11) and (12) seem
natural, there appears to be felicitous insensitive assessments of might
utterances. Conversely, some sensitive assessments of might utterances
seem deeply problematic. Consider the following as a reply to (10):
(13) ? You’re right. But I still had them when I came in.
Here, there seems to be a strong conflict between the conjuncts of (13).
But the two conjuncts would seem to be reconciled if we understood
‘you’re right’ as assessing whether the keys being in the car is compatible with Alice’s information. Apparently, then, we not only find the
insensitive assessments natural; we resist the sensitive assessment even
at the price of attributing contents with troubling internal conflicts.
The attribution of insensitive assessments in this sort of case is not
uncontroversial. The most powerful challenge comes from a forthcoming paper by Janice Dowell, where she looks at a wide range of cases
seemingly involving insensitive assessments, including one similar to
Lost Keys.7 Contrary to what we have said, she suggests that people
would naturally take the person asked about the whereabouts of the
keys (here: Alice) to make her might-claim relative to the set of propositions that are known by either of the parties involved in the conversation, not just information available to that person, because such a
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‘communal’ claim would contribute more to the search than would the
solipsistic one. Dowell’s hypothesis, then, is that we understand (10) as
saying that the keys being in the car is compatible with what is known
by either Alice or Beth.
Apart from the suggestion that such a communal claim would contribute more towards the purpose of the conversation and would make
good sense of both Beth’s possible replies, two other observations might
seem to support this hypothesis. They emerge if we compare (10) with
another reply Alice can give if she has no information about whether
Beth knows whether she brought the keys into the apartment:
(14) Could they be in the car?
Which utterance should Alice make? When comparing (10) and (14),
we share what according to Dowell is the majority intuition, namely
that (14) is preferable and that (10) now seems unwarranted. These
intuitions make sense on the assumption that both (10) and (14) are
understood as concerned with non-solipsistic epistemic possibilities, relating to a body of information that includes information available to
Beth, not just information available to Alice.
Dowell’s challenge is a worthy one, but we nevertheless think that
the natural initial interpretation of the case takes Alice to have solipsistic concerns, and takes Beth to accept or reject Alice’s claim based on
information going beyond those concerns. We have three reasons for
thinking this:
First, there seem to be strong independent reasons not to think
that interpretations of (10) made prior to comparisons with (14) are
communal. Suppose that after Beth made clear that she was looking
for her keys, Alice contributed the following:
(15) Given the information we have now, we can’t rule out that they’re
in the car.
(15) immediately raises concerns about warrant in a way that (10) does
not. This strongly suggests that (10) is not understood as a communal
claim. Moreover, consider the following dialogue, set in the same situation as Lost keys, with (10) reproduced as (17):
(16) Beth: I seem to have lost my keys.
(17) Alice: They might be in the car.
Vol. 6: Formal Semantics and Pragmatics: Discourse, Context, and Models
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(18) Beth: No, I distinctly remember having them when I came in.
Why did you say that without asking me?
(19) Alice: Look, I only said they might be there—and they might have
been. Sheesh!8
Here, Beth’s final question seems off the mark, but it would not have
been if (17) had been taken to express a communal claim, nor as a
follow-up on (15). This again suggests that we do not naturally take
(10) to express a communal claim.
Second, in contributing to a collective search, a speaker might be
perfectly cooperative in conveying that a certain possibility is compatible with her own information. If the possibility happens to be equally
compatible with what others know, they can add that information; if it
is not, they have the opportunity to help the speaker prune her epistemic possibilities. At the same time, it is of course true that if one
is warranted in asserting that the possibility is compatible with the
knowledge of all involved, this would be more helpful. However, since
it is fairly obvious that Alice would not be warranted in making the
stronger claim—as witnessed by concerns raised by (15)—the assumption that she is cooperative should only push us towards the communal
interpretation if we have some strong and obvious reason to think that
she would make an obviously unwarranted claim. But Lost Keys does
not give us any such reason.
Third, we think that neither the preference for the interrogative
(14) (‘Could they be in the car?’) over (10) (‘They might be in the
car’), nor the intuition that (10) is unwarranted that seems to be triggered by the comparison with (14), indicates that Alice is initially understood as concerned to express a communal proposition. Instead,
the introduction of (14) implicitly presents Alice as consciously aware
of the possibility that Beth might know whether she brought the keys
from the car, and such awareness would make the interrogative preferable and the utterance of (10) unwarranted.
To see this, notice first that the question contributes more to the
project of finding the keys than would a solipsistic might-judgment. Expressing the solipsistic might-judgment would (a) raise the possibility
that the keys are in the car and (b) convey that Alice lacks information
that rules it out. However, asking Beth whether the keys might be in the
car would also do both (a) and (b), but would additionally (c) express
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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recognition of the fact that Beth might be in an epistemically superior
position relative to this possibility, thus contributing in one more way
towards the goal at hand.9 In a choice between the two locutions, a
cooperative speaker will thus choose the interrogative. On the other
hand, the richer contribution of the interrogative also demands more
processing on the part of the speaker: in particular, it demands a more
definite view of the relative epistemic access that the parties have to
the possibility in question and to possible informational bases. The
suggestion, then, is this: when we first consider Lost Keys, we attribute
a solipsistic concern to Alice. In doing so, we are not assuming that she
has paid much attention to her and Beth’s relative epistemic access: we
just see her presenting a possibility as compatible with what she knows.
When we are subsequently asked to compare (10) and (14), however,
we are thereby introduced to a perspective where Alice pays attention
to the fact that Beth might have more relevant information. Now the
question seems much more appropriate than the claim (depending, as
always, on prosody and other details on the context).
This leaves the question of why the introduction of the question
leads many to feel not only that (10) is inappropriate, but also that it is
unwarranted. The explanation, we think, is quite simple: Since making the solipsistic claim might be inappropriate given the awareness of
Beth’s epistemic position—the question would be preferable—what we
are considering when asking whether Alice might be warranted in uttering (10) is now indeed whether she would be warranted in making
the communal claim. Since she lacks such warrant, (10) now strikes us
as unwarranted. If this explanation is correct, however, this intuition,
or the intuition that (14) is preferable, does not indicate that the initial
interpretation of Lost Keys is communal.
All told, then, we think that the natural interpretation of Alice’s concerns in making and expressing the might-judgment by uttering (10)
takes these concerns to relate to a solipsistic body of information, not
one including information possessed exclusively by Beth. Since both
(11) and (12) were natural replies, expressions of might-judgments
seem to be subject to felicitous insensitive assessments.10
As with assessments of taste-judgments, some assessment phrases
go less well with insensitive assessments (Egan 2007, 4n). When Alice
suggests that the keys might be in the car, the following replies would
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seem decidedly uncooperative:
(20) That’s not true / That’s false / You’re mistaken. I still had them
when I came in.
We later attempt an explanation of the difference in reactions to these
and to (11).
4.

THE PUZZLE OF APPARENTLY FELICITOUS INSENSITIVE
ASSESSMENTS

Thus far, we have argued that there are felicitous insensitive assessments of taste- and might-claims. However, their existence is puzzling
in a number of ways. They depart from what seems to be the norm for
assessments, namely the sort of coincidence in speaker and assessor
interests illustrated by how we approach Xena’s telling Zac that ‘They
live in the first big building to the right of the cathedral.’ It would
seem thoroughly misplaced to accept or reject Xena’s utterance on the
ground that some people that we have in mind live to the left of a cathedral we have in mind as seen from a direction we have in mind, unless
those were the people, the cathedral, and the perspective Xena had in
mind or could reasonably be taken to have in mind when addressing
Zac.11 But apparently such shifts are possible or even mandatory when
it comes to ‘tasty’ or ‘might’, at least in certain contexts. The question
is why.
Insensitive assessments are also psychologically puzzling. To attribute a sincere assertion to a person, one needs to grasp what proposition the person was asserting and expressing the acceptance of: one
will thus already have that proposition readily available for assessment.
(When Beth takes Alice to think that the keys might be in the car, we
can assume that Beth understands that it is based on solipsistic considerations, and when Felicia takes Eduardo to think that fish sticks are
tasty, we can assume that she understands that his thought relates to
his standard of taste.) Moreover, since the proposition in question is
one that the speaker takes to be true and wants to communicate, assessing whether it is in fact true would seem to be of interest for any
cooperative addressee. In fact, it would seem to require a mental effort
not to assess whether a proposition is true once it is represented before
one’s mind, as it were.12
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Finally, the puzzle has a social or normative aspect. If Eduardo is
concerned to express that the fish sticks are pleasing to his palate, how
can it be fair of Felicia to assess his utterance based on her palate? And
if Alice was concerned to express that the keys being in the car was
compatible with information accessible to her, how can it be fair of
Beth to assess Alice’s utterance based on compatibility with information
going beyond that?
The main contribution of this paper is an attempt to begin answering such questions, explaining why certain kinds of expressions and
judgments invite insensitive assessments, and explaining why such assessments are psychologically and conversationally appropriate and
sometimes required. First, however, we shall briefly note the relation between this issue and the debate about assessor-relativism, where
seemingly felicitous assessments have been taken to call for some radical changes in philosophical semantics. We think that the question of
insensitive assessment is of independent interest, but we shall argue
that one of the upshots of the explanation proposed here is that insensitive assessment gives us no reason to give up standard contextualist
accounts in favour of an assessor-relative semantics, or non-standard
forms of contextualism.
5. ASSESSOR-RELATIVISM, CLOUDY CONTEXTUALISM AND
C-ASSESSMENT

We have said that in light of the sort of concerns people have when
deciding whether something is tasty or might be the case and when
expressing such judgments using ‘tasty’ and ‘might’, the following sorts
of analyses seem tempting:
TASTY-C: An utterance of a sentence of the form X is tasty
is true if and only if X accords with the standard of taste
that is relevant in the context of utterance.
MIGHT-C: An utterance of a sentence of the form P might be
the case is true if and only if P is compatible with the body
of information that is relevant in the context of utterance.
But the existence of felicitous insensitive assessments make trouble
for these analyses given something like the following natural-sounding
Vol. 6: Formal Semantics and Pragmatics: Discourse, Context, and Models
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standard principle of assessment:
S-ASSESSMENT: When we assess assertive utterances or
judgments using various assessment phrases, we normally
(barring confusion, misunderstanding, lack of cooperation,
etc) assess the satisfaction of their truth-conditions.
The problem is that in the cases of felicitous insensitive assessments
that we have looked at, the assessments have not seemed to relate to
the standards of taste or bodies of information that were relevant in
the context of utterance, but rather to those relevant to the assessor, or
relevant in the context of assessment.
To accommodate felicitous insensitive assessments of judgments
of taste or epistemic modals within the constraints given by SASSESSMENT, it thus seems that the truth-conditions of the sentences
need to depend, somehow, on the assessor, or his standard of taste or
accessible body of information. Consequently, a number of authors
(MacFarlane 2011; Egan 2007; Egan et al. 2005; Lasersohn 2005;
Stephenson 2007; e.g.) have proposed analyses according to which the
truth of claims of the form P might be the case or X is tasty is relative to
contexts of assessment. This allows for the following assessor-relativistic
alternative to MIGHT-C and TASTY-C:
TASTY-R: An utterance of a sentence of the form X is tasty
is true relative to a context of assessment if and only if
X accords with the standard of taste of that context. (cf.
Lasersohn 2005; Stephenson 2007; MacFarlane ms).
MIGHT-R: An utterance of a sentence of the form P might
be the case is true relative to a context of assessment if and
only if P is compatible with the information available in
that context (cf. MacFarlane 2011; Egan 2007; Stephenson
2007).13
These analyses seem to straightforwardly account for insensitive assessments, given S-ASSESSMENT and given the assumption that, by
default, assessors assess truth-values relative to their standards of taste
or available information.14 Beth is correct to reject Alice’s utterance
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that the keys might be in the car by uttering (11), since she has more information available in her context, and she would be wrong to accept
Alice’s utterance given that information (as revealed by the infelicity
of (13)). Alice, on the other hand, was correct to accept her own utterance given the information available to her at the time. (Felicia’s
assessments of Eduardo’s taste-claim can obviously be handled in the
same way, mutatis mutandis.)
Though assessor-relativism might help us reconcile insensitive assessments with S-ASSESSMENT, it does little in itself to explain the
phenomenon of felicitous insensitive assessments. Saying that it is part
of the semantics of expressions like ‘tasty’ and ‘might’ that they contribute to assessor-relative truth-conditions deepens the puzzle rather
than solves it: if insensitive assessments are puzzling in the first place,
it is even more puzzling that they would become mandated by the conventional meaning of certain expressions.15
In an attempt to shed light on this issue, John MacFarlane (MacFarlane 2007, 29–30) suggests that some expressions have an assessorrelative semantics to allow for disagreement in areas where there is no
objective fact of the matter. We have an interest in sharing standards of
taste and epistemic states with those around us, and insensitive assessments, he suggests, might serve the purpose of fostering controversy,
thereby prompting coordination of subjective attitudes. But though an
interest in coordinating attitudes might indeed be part of the explanation of why there are felicitous insensitive assessments, this does no
more than hint at possible explanations. For one, there seem to be
significant differences between matters of taste and epistemic matters
as to why coordination matters and how it is plausibly achieved. In
the case of taste-judgments, it seems that much pressure towards coordination is primarily a matter of social or group pressure, whereas
in the case of coordination of might-judgments, it seems to be primarily information-driven. Moreover, unless assessment-relative semantics
is more suited for prompting coordination than is standard utterancerelative semantics, this explanation does not even get off the ground.
But it is not clear why the relevant social pressures and the relevant
exchange of information could not operate without insensitive assessments. Why couldn’t coordinative pressures work as well if ‘tasty’ operated like ‘tall’, allowing replies involving sensitive assessments such
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as ‘yes, and they are tasty for me too’ or ‘yes, but they are disgusting
by my standards’? (Compare: A: ‘John is tall.’ B: ‘Yes, and tall for a
basket ball player too’ or ‘yes, but he is short for basket ball player.’)
And why couldn’t the exchange of information leading us to revise our
epistemic perspectives work as well with a semantics similarly allowing Beth to felicitously reply to Alice’s ‘the keys might be in the car’
with ‘yes, but they can’t be there’, with ‘can’t’ relating to information
available to Beth, or to either Alice or Beth?
Supposing that assessor-relativism could be supplied with a credible explanation of why some locutions contribute to assessor-relative
truth-conditions, a remaining worry about the assessor-relativistic strategy is that it requires a radical revision of standard truth-conditional
semantics according to which truth-conditions of sentences are determined in contexts of utterance. Partly because of these worries, Kai
von Fintel and Anthony Gillies (2011) have proposed what they take
to be a less revolutionary way to accommodate insensitive assessments
of might-utterances. Their suggestion is that such utterances have indeterminate contexts, underdetermined by facts about the conversation thus far and thus falling short of determining one set of truthconditions for the sentence. Instead, these utterances ‘put in play’
a ‘cloud’ of determinate contexts and a corresponding set of propositions (with non-relative truth-conditions). Furthermore, von Fintel
and Gillies suggest, speakers are justified in uttering might-sentences if
they are justified in asserting one of the propositions in that set. Since
Alice is justified in asserting that the keys being in the car is compatible
with what she knows and since this proposition is one of those put in
play as she utters ‘They might be in the car,’ her utterance is justified.
The hearer, in turn, can confirm (deny) the utterance if she can confirm
(deny) the strongest of the propositions in the set that she is also in a
position to deem either true or false. Why the strongest? Because this is
what will prove must useful in furthering the goal of the conversation.
In the case of Alice and Beth, that goal is to find the keys, and more
specifically, after Alice’s utterance, to determine whether they are in
the car. For this purpose, it would be most helpful to make known the
truth-value of the proposition that the keys being in the car is compatible
with the aggregate of information accessible to either Beth or Alice. That
proposition, von Fintel and Gillies suggest, is also among those put in
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play by Alice’s utterance, and after Alice’s utterance, it is something
that Beth is arguably in a position to confirm or deny (confirm if her
memory does not exclude it; deny if it does).
Like assessor-relativism, ‘cloudy’ contextualism might help us reconcile insensitive assessments with S-ASSESSMENT by changing the
way we think about truth-conditions of utterances, but like assessorrelativism it does little to explain the phenomenon of felicitous insensitive assessments. As von Fintel and Gillies stress, indeterminacy
in what is expressed by utterances is not a surprising phenomenon,
but other things in their account call for explanations. Why does the
speaker only need to be justified in asserting the weakest of the propositions that are put in play? Why should the speaker be taken to have
put in play propositions that she was clearly not warranted in asserting? Shouldn’t charity rule out those readings? And why is the assessor
justified in assessing a proposition that the speaker cannot charitably
be taken to have asserted? There seems to be no attempt to answer
the first three questions and the answer we are offered to the last
question is merely the suggestion that the purpose of the conversation makes it more relevant to assess the truth-value of the communal might-proposition, than to assess the truth-value of the solipsistic
might-proposition Alice was warranted in asserting. Now, we do think
that this particular suggestion points in the right direction, and it is
compatible with the explanation that we develop in coming sections.
But in itself it hardly even begins to explain the phenomena of felicitous
insensitive assessments. Suppose that as Alice and Beth are looking for
the keys, Alice calls from one of the two rooms of the apartment:
(21) They are not in here!
There are contexts in which this sentence would be used to express the
proposition that the keys are not in Alice’s room, and contexts in which
it would be used to express the proposition that the keys are not in
the apartment. Suppose that it is indeterminate what this context is: it
is not publicly manifest which proposition Alice meant, or which was
conversationally required. Suppose also that Beth has just found the
keys in her room and that she is thus in a position to reject the stronger
of these propositions. As far as von Fintel and Gillies’ account goes, we
should thus expect the following reply to (21) to be felicitous:
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(22) ? On the contrary, I just found them in this room.
The fact that it is clearly infelicitous does not in any way show that
von Fintel and Gillies’ account is mistaken, as they can add further
constraints or deny that (21) puts in play the proposition that the keys
are not in the apartment. But further constraints would be needed, or
an account of when utterances put propositions in play that speakers
are not in a position to assert.
Finally, it is unclear whether the ‘cloudy’ strategy can accommodate the relevant cases. It requires that context or publicly manifested
speaker intentions leave open that the proposition targeted by felicitous insensitive assessments was expressed by the utterance. However,
we have argued that it is publicly manifest that Alice’s utterance of
‘They might be in the car’ does not express a communal might-claim.
Moreover, even if our conclusion about that case is controversial, the
requirement of openness is clearly violated in the case of taste-claims:
it is obvious that Eduardo did not intend to assert a proposition implying that the fish sticks accord with Felicia’s standard of taste when
he uttered ‘They are really tasty’. At least, then, it is doubtful that the
‘cloudy’ strategy would generalize beyond epistemic modals.
Our own strategy for approaching the problem of felicitous insensitive assessments, outlined in Almér & Björnsson (2009), is instead
to reject S-ASSESSMENT, and substitute for it a version that takes the
conditions whose satisfaction is assessed when we assess utterances to
depend on the context of assessment:
C-ASSESSMENT: When we assess assertive utterances using various assessment phrases, we normally, (barring confusion, misunderstanding, etc) assess the satisfaction of the
conditions that are made most immediately salient by the
utterances as we assess them.
In most cases, the truth-conditions of utterances are indeed made most
salient, but in cases allowing for felicitous insensitive assessments, thinking about the utterance in the context of assessment makes some other
conditions more salient than the truth-conditions of the utterance. When
Felicia assesses Eduardo’s utterance of ‘fish sticks are tasty’, the condition made most salient by Eduardo’s utterance is that fish sticks accord
with Felicia’s palate; when Beth assesses Alice’s assertoric utterance of
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‘the keys might be in the car’, the condition made most salient by her
utterance in Beth’s context of assessment is the condition that the key’s
being in the car is compatible with the aggregate of information had
by either Alice or Beth, or perhaps just that had by Beth.16
The suggestion that we can felicitously assess an utterance as true
or false without assessing the truth-conditions of that utterance might
seem incoherent. But this incoherence goes away once we distinguish
between the truth-conditions that do serious work in semantic theory
and everyday assessments of truth and falsity that, everyone should
agree, might be governed by considerations pulling in a different direction than the semanticist’s theoretical needs. As semanticists, we
should say that Eduardo’s utterance of ’fish sticks are tasty’ is true, or
expresses a proposition that is true, if and only if the fish sticks accord with his palate, because this makes best sense of the production
and successful uptake of the utterance, capturing the conditions that
governed Eduardo’s judgment and choice of words as well as conditions involved in hearers’ understanding of the utterance. But Felicia’s
assessment, we want to argue, is not an attempt to contribute to semantic theory, and is governed by pragmatic considerations in the light
of which the utterance makes a different condition salient.
Another worry about the intelligibility of C-ASSESSMENT stems
from the fact that the existence of a semantic assessment already presupposes an object of assessment, i.e. a condition the satisfaction of
which is being assessed. Consequently, there can be no assessment
before there is such an object, and thus no place for the assessment
to be part of what pragmatically determines that object.17 However,
what can be determined pragmatically is whether an utterance will be
understood as the conversational target of an assessment directed at
certain satisfaction conditions. Eduardo’s utterance (‘They are really
tasty!) prompts Felicia to assess the condition that fish sticks accord
with Felicia’s taste, and this assessment is intuitively understood as
targeting Eduardo’s utterance because this condition is the one made
most immediately salient by the utterance when Felicia is making the
assessment. Because of this, she can naturally express the assessment
as an assessment of the utterance, uttering ‘No, they are too bland’ as
a direct response.
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Finally, it might also seem that the appeal to C-ASSESSMENT immediately runs foul of cases where the target of felicitous insensitive
assessments are fixed not just by being the preceding utterance, but
with the help of definite descriptions such as ‘what he said’ and ‘the
proposition he asserted’:
(23) Eduardo: The fish sticks are very tasty!
(24) Felicia: What he said is true. They are fantastic!
(25) Felicia: The proposition he asserted is true. They are fantastic!
The most obvious problem with this objection is that the referent of
‘what he said’ is equally affected by pragmatic considerations. It is well
known that the expression can pick out, at the very least, the words
used, the ‘literal’ meaning of the sentence, and the speaker meaning
of the utterance. As long as ’what he said’ in (24) does not pick out
the proposition expressed by Eduardo in (23), the felicity of (24) provides no direct problem for an account resting on C-ASSESSMENT.
‘The proposition he asserted’, on the other hand, is technical jargon,
unlikely to pick out anything determinate outside of semantic theory
and thus unsuitable for eliciting theoretically unbiased linguistic intuitions. Moreover, even if either of these expressions managed to pick
out the proposition asserted by Eduardo, the predication of truth might
itself be a matter of metonymy, attributing truth to a proposition suitably related to the proposition picked out by the expression, just as ’I’m
parked out back’ attributes being parked out back to an entity suitably
related to the speaker (though the former case would be much more
subtle, as the two propositions are much more similar than a car and
its owner).
Of course, for an appeal to pragmatic considerations to help us
explain felicitous insensitive assessments, we need to say something
substantial about what those pragmatic considerations are, just as the
appeal to assessor-relative truth-conditions or clouds of propositions
put in play by utterances tells us little without explanations that remain to be supplied. In whatever way one wants to accommodate
felicitous insensitive assessments, one needs further explanatory work,
and one needs to be able to explain why certain locutions and conversational contexts invite or demand these assessments. In what follows,
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we will supply pragmatic explanations that are easily combined with
C-ASSESSMENT.18 Much of what we say can probably be adapted to
the other two frameworks considered in this section, but before closing we will suggest that ours provide the better fit with the data we
consider.
6. A FIRST, TRIVIAL, STEP: PRAGMATICS CAN AFFECT THE FELICITY
OF INSENSITIVE ASSESSMENT

Generally speaking, we should expect assessments of utterances or
judgments to target the propositions expressed or endorsed, for the
reasons spelled out in section 4. But the point of departure for the explanations that we are about to propose is that the proposition targeted
by expressions of assessment can be affected by pragmatic considerations: what proposition ‘no’ rejects and ‘yes’ or ‘that’s true’ confirms can
depend not only on the proposition expressed or asserted just before.
Before we consider how and why this phenomenon is instantiated by
insensitive assessments of taste-claims and might-claims in later sections, it is helpful to look at some less controversial examples. First,
consider (27) as a possible reply to (26), uttered during a search for
Beth’s keys:
(26) A: I wonder if the keys are in the car.
(27) B: No, Beth has them in her pocket.
‘No’ in (27) is perfectly natural, though it clearly targets a proposition other than the proposition asserted by a previous utterance. However, it is only natural when what is at issue is the whereabouts of the
keys.19 Things would be different if (26) were preceded by:
(28) C: Who wonders if the keys are in the car?
Now (27) would seem ill-placed, at cross-purpose with the conversation. Instead, it could be natural for B to let “no” target the proposition
asserted in (26):
(29) B: No you don’t, you know that Beth has them in her pocket.
On the other hand, (29) would be infelicitous as a reply to (26) in its
original setting. Apparently, what is plausibly at issue as the assessment
is made affects our understanding of the target of the assessment.
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When (27) fails to target the proposition asserted in (26), it nevertheless targets a proposition expressed by that sentence. In other
cases, we get similar shifts, but seemingly to propositions that were
not explicitly expressed by the original utterance:
(30) A: I couldn’t believe how tall Kiel was.
(31) B: No, it was almost freakish.
(32) B: ? No, you couldn’t.
Here, (31) seems perfectly natural, but ‘no’ seems to mirror the negation in (30), negating the proposition that B could believe how tall Kiel
was, a proposition not expressed or conversationally implied by (30).
By negating that proposition, ‘no’ expresses disbelief on B’s part mirroring that just expressed by A, thus contributing to a general human
interest in comparing and confirming attitudes, and thus to an intelligible and expected conversational goal (cf. Björnsson & Finlay 2010,
19–20). Again, we can see that the naturalness of (31) and the inappropriateness of (32) depend on what is at issue in the conversation
at the time: in a conversation where A is asked by suspicious interrogators about his reaction to Kiel, B might help confirm the reaction
reported in (30) by uttering (32).
Though we take these examples involving attitude reports to exemplify pragmatic considerations of just the sorts that we also take to
explain felicitous insensitive assessments of taste- and might-claims,
we do not deny that there seem to be some clear and important differences. One such difference is also our reason to use these cases for illustration: here it is clear that the assessment targets conditions other than
those that the speaker was concerned to get across as true, whereas the
cases of felicitous insensitive assessments that we discussed in sections
2 and 3 were considerably more subtle. In section 8, we suggest an
explanation of those differences; here our concern has merely been to
introduce the general phenomenon. We now turn to the pragmatics of
assessments of taste-judgments.
7. ASSESSING JUDGMENTS OF PERSONAL TASTE

Two pragmatic factors seem to be at play in typical contexts where
people make judgments to the effect that some item accords (or does
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not accord) with their own taste. First, potential assessors of such
judgments are unlikely to be in a better position to determine their
correctness than was the original speaker’s. Since assessments from
manifestly inferior epistemic positions are unlikely to be conversationally appropriate, we should expect a (defeasible) presumption against
sensitive assessments of such judgments. Second, just as people take
a great deal of interest in similarities and differences in attitudes, they
typically find comparisons of personal taste interesting in ways that,
say, comparisons of an object’s distance to other objects chosen at random are not. This provides a general (defeasible) reason in favour of
interpreting utterances in ways that take them to contribute to such
comparisons.
We suggest that because of these two factors, there is a default
pragmatic pressure towards the sort of shift that we saw in (31) above.
There, an interest in comparisons of attitudes focused the assessment
on a proposition ascribing an attitude to the assessor rather than on
an expressed proposition ascribing the same attitude to the original
speaker. Similarly, in accepting or rejecting a prior taste-claim, people
can be expected to express acceptance or rejection of a corresponding
proposition that relates to their own standard of taste rather than that
of the original speaker.
The last claim should not be controversial: everyone should agree
that this is at least part of what we do on such occasions. When Eduardo has claimed that the fish sticks are tasty and Felicia replies ‘No,
they are too bland,’ there is no doubt that she has thereby let her audience know that the fish sticks do not accord with her taste.
The substantial claim, instead, is that this is explained by the above
pragmatic considerations. If this claim is correct, we should expect
changes in these pragmatic factors to make insensitive assessments less
natural. Two sorts of changes are relevant: those that make comparisons less interesting and those that make speaker authority less of a
problem. Comparisons become less interesting when (a) it is already
manifest what the assessor’s standard of taste says about the item in
question and (b) there is some other point to assessing a prior tasteclaim. Speaker authority becomes less of a problem if (c) the act of
assessment does not purport to bring to bear independent epistemic authority or if (d) the speaker’s access to the object of his taste-judgment
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is less direct than immediate experience, such that there is a significant
space for error.
What follows is an example involving (a), (b) and (c). The interest in taste comparisons is reduced by letting speaker and assessor
belong to species that have manifestly radically different food preferences. The assessment is offered as a way of acknowledging the prior
taste-judgment, and acknowledgements do not require independent
epistemic authority. Moreover, the taste-claim is acknowledged by way
of preparing for a comment on its relevance for a conversationally pertinent purpose made salient by that comment:
(33) Vinnie the Vulture: This rotten lamb is truly delicious.
(34) We: Yes Vinnie, but too much will make you drowsy.20
It is easy to imagine a context where the confirming assessment of Vinnie’s utterance does not seem to express that the rotten lamb accords
with our taste.
The next case involves (d) instead of (c): the assessor has better
epistemic access to the object of judgment than the speaker. Again,
the parties of the conversation are dissimilar enough for comparisons
of taste to seem less tempting, and the correction of a mistake on the
part of the speaker provides a conversational interest other than taste
comparison:
(35) Little Dana: The sauce looks yummy!21
(36) Parent: No, Dana, it is too spicy.
The parent’s reply is easily understood as relating to Dana’s palate, not
to the parent’s.
These and other cases seem to support the pragmatic explanation:
when we neutralize the two pragmatic factors that we have suggested
explain felicitous insensitive assessments of judgments of personal taste,
sensitive assessments become perfectly natural.22
Similar considerations seem to apply to other predicates of personal taste (‘fun’, ‘boring’, ‘bland’, ‘disgusting’, ‘delicious’), but they
are notably absent in much other discourse about relative or perspective dependent matters. Consider, for example, claims about whether
something is to the right or to the left, claims made true or false by facts
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about how things are located relative to some contextually determined
spatially oriented perspective. Here it is clear that speakers do not in
general have the same sort of privileged access to such facts as they
typically have in the case of judgments of personal taste. There is thus
no general presumption against sensitive assessments. It is also clear
that we have no general interest in comparing how an object relates
to one perspective to how it relates to a different perspective, but instead a general interest in locating objects in a spatial framework that
is independent of particular spatial frameworks. Not only are the factors that direct assessments of judgments of personal taste away from
the proposition endorsed to an assessor-relating proposition absent in
such cases, but also our basic interests in these matters call for sensitive
assessments. Given this, and given a general presumption that assessments are sensitive, we should not expect felicitous insensitive assessments of right/left claims. The same is true about, e.g. pronouns: even
in the case of the first person singular, we have no general expectation
of speaker authority, and our general interest in comparing properties
of different individuals picked out by the same pronoun as the conversation unfolds do not come close to our interest in comparing attitudes
or taste preferences.
8. EXPLICIT RELATIVIZATION

Many have pointed out that explicit relativizations of judgments of
taste to the speaker’s standard block insensitive assessments (see e.g.
Stephenson 2007 492–493; MacFarlane 2007, 29–30):
(37) A: This is super tasty for someone with my palate.
(38) B: No, it is too bland.
Here, ‘no’ in (38) either seems sensitive to the concern of A (in
which case we might wonder what grounds B had for thinking that
A was mistaken), or else seems inappropriately insensitive, strongly
inviting a reply like
(39) A: I didn’t say you would like it; I said that someone with my
taste would.
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This is not surprising given the pragmatic explanations suggested above.
Given that we generally assume that taste-claims are made relative to
the speaker’s standard of taste, the explicit relativization serves to focus conversational interest specifically to this relative standard, thus
reigning in our general interests in comparing taste. Perhaps equally
important is that a sentence with an explicit relativizing phrase makes
more salient the relation to the speaker’s palate as we consider an assessment of the utterance. Given C-ASSESSMENT, we can expect this
to prevent insensitive assessments.
Similar considerations explain why implicatures are not in general
naturally taken as targets of assessments, even when the speaker might
be in a clear position of authority regarding the truth-conditions of the
sentence and even when assessing the implicature would be conversationally relevant. Suppose that, in assessing a PhD candidate, I say:
(40) Jane has excellent handwriting and is very punctual.
I might be in a position of authority regarding what is explicitly said
here, and it might be conversationally appropriate for you to take issue with my implicated assessment of Jane’s qualities as a philosopher.
Nevertheless, “no” in the following does not naturally seem to target
the implicature that Jane lacks philosophical important qualities:
(41) No, she is an excellent philosopher.
The reason, we suggest, is two-fold: not only does the implicature
have to compete with the invariant contents of the expressions in (40),
having to do with satisfying standards of handwriting and punctuality,
but we appreciate the implicature only by grasping these contents and
the resulting explicit message.23
Finally, we take similar considerations to explain why felicitous insensitive assessments of attitude reports of the sort discussed in section
6 are more obviously insensitive than standard insensitive assessments
of taste-claims. The former ignore the invariant contents of some of
the expressions in the targeted utterances, such as the contents of the
embedding attitude clause (‘I wonder if. . . .’), or ignore the referent
of a contextually sensitive expression not itself subject to the pragmatic considerations that prompt insensitive assessments (‘I couldn’t
believe. . . ’).
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9. ACCUSATIONS AND INSENSITIVE ASSESSMENTS

We have already noted that some assessment phrases seem to block
felicitous insensitive assessments. For example:
(42) Eduardo: The fish sticks are really tasty!
(43) Felicia: No, they are too bland!
(44) Felicia: That’s true, they are delicious!
(45) Felicia: That’s false. They are too bland!
(46) Felicia: He is mistaken. They are too bland!
We have argued that Felicia’s replies in (43) and (44) can express felicitous insensitive assessments of Eduardo’s claim. But it seems, at least
to our ears, that in (45) and (46) Felicia either presupposes that Eduardo doesn’t know how the fish sticks taste to him, or that Eduardo intended his claim to relate to standards transcending his personal taste.
Either way, we are strongly inclined to understand the assessment as a
sensitive one.
We propose an explanation of why ‘that’s false’ goes badly with insensitive assessments that builds on Andy Egan’s (2007: 4n) explanation of why ‘false’ is inappropriate for insensitive assessments of mightclaims. Egan points out that to say that someone said something ‘false’
is to attribute some rational or epistemic error. Since insensitive assessments can be felicitous even though the target utterance isn’t based on
any error, the use of ‘false’ is inappropriate. We think that this is almost
right. With Egan, we think that saying that someone is ‘mistaken’ or
has said something ‘false’ is often understood as an accusation of either
erroneous reasoning or lack of honesty. Accusations of erroneous reasoning call attention to the concerns and processes leading the accused
to his judgment, and accusations of lacking honesty need to relate to
the concerns of the speaker in order to be fair. Since accusations of
either kind need to relate to speaker concerns, they cannot be insensitive assessments. Given the interpretive assumption that Felicia’s assessments in (45) and (46) are conversationally appropriate, they thus
have to be understood as attempts at sensitive assessments.24
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10. DISAGREEMENT

Though our primary concern here is insensitive assessments, this issue
is intimately connected to issues of disagreement through the following
link: it is natural to say that A disagrees with B when A felicitously
rejects something that B has said, or when A has a view such that A
could felicitously reject some judgment of B’s. In either of these senses,
Felicia seems to disagree with Eduardo when he says that the fish sticks
are tasty.25
Because of this, our pragmatic explanation of why taste-claims allow for and sometimes require insensitive assessments also explains the
existence of so-called ‘faultless disagreement’ (Kölbel 2004; 2009). Felicia can disagree with Eduardo without either having committed any
mistake relative to their own concerns because Felicia’s rejection can
target a different proposition, or different truth-conditions, than Eduardo’s taste-judgment.
One might ask, though, what the object of such a disagreement is.
Intuitively, Eduardo and Felicia disagree about whether the fish sticks
are tasty, but ‘the fish sticks are tasty’ expresses no proposition (in the
sense we use ‘proposition’ here) unless related to some standard of
taste or other. The minimal answer, that we think everyone should
agree upon, is that when we talk of the object of disagreement here, we
abstract away from the propositions that concern the parties: the object
of disagreement is such that when it is supplied with relevant standards
of taste, it yields the full propositions that the parties are concerned to
reject or affirm. (Such abstractions are of course commonplace, as
when we say that ‘everyone got something tasty’, meaning that each
relevant individual got something tasty for that individual, or when we
say that Billy and Bob both wear shoes that are too small, meaning that
each wears shoes too small for him.)26
11. SOLVING THE PUZZLE OF INSENSITIVE ASSESSMENTS

Assuming that these explanations are correct, we have the beginnings
of a solution to the puzzle of insensitive assessments. We have an explanation of why assessments need not be directed at the propositions
that the speaker accepted and wanted to communicate, even though
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grasping those very propositions should be part of the process of understanding the speaker. What happens in cases of felicitous insensitive assessments is not that these propositions are not being assessed,
but rather that their assessment is conversationally irrelevant. We also
have a solution to the socially puzzling aspects of insensitive assessments: since such assessments carry no accusatory elements, there is
no unfairness involved. Finally, we have an explanation of why some
locutions—predicates of personal taste—invite insensitive assessments
and an explanation of why others—‘right/left’, personal pronouns—do
not. It is easy to see how the latter, negative, explanation extends to
numerous other locutions that convey relations to objects determined
by the context of utterance, such as ‘it’s raining’ (where and when?), ‘a
local X’ (local relative to what location?) or ‘X is ready’ (to do what?).
In what follows, we will say something about how the former, positive,
explanation extends to might-claims and beyond.
12. ASSESSING EPISTEMIC MODALS

Solipsistic might-claims share one important pragmatic property with
subjective taste-claims: hearers are rarely in a position to assess the
proposition the truth of which the speaker was concerned to get right
and communicate to the hearer, except on the basis of the speaker’s authority. As in the case of subjective taste-claims, hearers are therefore
rarely in a situation in which it would be conversationally appropriate
to voice such assessments. But another pragmatic property is equally
important in blocking hearer’s sensitive assessments of might-claims.
As noted in section 3, the central cognitive role of judgments to the
effect that some proposition P might be the case, and the central conversational purpose of claims to the same effect, is to guide strategies of
uncertainty relative to P: to direct the way we search for more evidence
for or against P, hedge our bets and direct our contingency planning.
Since we want to guide these strategies by as much relevant information as is feasible, the fact that P is compatible with a subset of the
relevant information we can feasibly take into account is irrelevant for
this purpose. If Beth knows something that rules out that the keys are
in the car, the fact that information accessible to Alice does not rule
this out is irrelevant to Beth’s search for the keys, and once she gives
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Alice access to this further information, the proposition becomes irrelevant for Alice’s search too. What would be highly relevant, however, is
confirmation or denial of the communal proposition that information
accessible to either Alice or Beth fails to rule out that the keys are in
the car.
Recall the dialogue in Lost Keys, with Beth’s two alternative replies
to Alice:
(47) Alice: The keys might be in the car.
(48) Beth: No, they can’t be. I still had them when I came in.
(49) Beth: Yes, you’re right, they might be. I’ll go look.
The suggestion now is that pragmatic considerations governing our
typical interest in might propositions and might facts lead us to understand Beth’s assessments in (48) and (49) as concerned with the
communal proposition, just as the pragmatic considerations associated
with tasty-claims led us to understand Felicia’s assessments as concerned with conformity to her standards of taste.27
If this is right, contextual changes manipulating these pragmatic
considerations should make insensitive assessments less natural, just
as they did in the case of subjective taste-claims. To avoid the effect of
speaker authority, we can either (a) let it be manifest to the hearer what
information the speaker has when making a solipsistic might-claim, (b)
let the assessment target a might-claim made relative to information
other than that available to the speaker, such as a communal claim or
one made relative to information available to someone else entirely or
(c) let the assessment be one that does not purport to carry authority
independent of that of the speaker. To avoid the problem that epistemic strategies favour might-claims relating to the most expansive set
of relevant information that can feasibly be processed, we need contexts where it is manifest that the assessor’s role is not to help guide
epistemic strategies in the best way possible. For example, the assessor
might be in the business of (d) assessing the rationality of an action,
(e) explaining an action, or (f) guiding the original speaker’s epistemic
actions only relative to information available to the speaker. Let us just
use two cases that illustrate these effects. The first employs (a) and
(f). It involves a dialogue between a participant in a game show who
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will win the prize if correctly guessing behind which of ten doors it is
located, and the host, who knows that the prize is behind door 3:
(50) Participant, concluding a chain of reasoning: So the prize might
be behind door 2?
(51) Host: Yes.
(52) (52) Host: No, you have ruled out door 2, but it might be behind
either 3 or 10.28
It is easy to imagine a context where the host is not expected to provide
participants with further information, but might help them use that
information. In such a context, the participant’s question relates to
information available to her and not to the host’s inside knowledge,
and the host’s assessments are best understood as sensitively relating
to the very same information.
The second case involves (c) and (e). Here is Alice again, this time
on the phone:
(53) When Beth realized that she might have left her keys in the car,
she rushed out through the ice-cold rain to check. But just a
moment later, I found the keys here under the groceries. She will
not be happy when she comes back all soaked.
To say that someone realizes that P implies that P, so the first sentence
of (53) implies a positive assessment of Beth’s thought that she might
have left the keys in the car. The assessment is made as part of an
explanation of Beth’s behaviour and thus implies no independent authority regarding the truth of the proposition that Beth accepted. As
predicted, we naturally understand it as made relative to information
had by Beth (or Beth and Alice) at the time, not relative to information
had by Alice now.29
What we see in these and other examples is that sensitive assessments become the norm when we remove the pragmatic factors that
otherwise block such assessments and make relevant assessments of
the propositions targeted by insensitive assessments. In this way, insensitive assessments of might-judgments behave very much like insensitive assessments of taste-claims.30
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13. INSENSITIVE ASSESSMENTS IN OTHER AREAS

This section has two objectives. The first is to make plausible that the
pragmatic factors at work in the case of ‘tasty’ and ‘might’ have analogies in other areas where people have suggested assessor-relativistic
accounts of intuitions about insensitive assessments and disagreement.
The second is to suggest further areas in which we should expect similar pragmatic considerations to apply. We begin with the first, looking
at conditionals, ought-claims and gradable adjectives. Though each of
these three areas merit more space than we can give them here, our
hope is to indicate the sort of pragmatic considerations that they raise.
Ought-Claims: In response to Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane’s
(ms) intriguing case for an assessor-relativistic analysis of ought-claims,
Björnsson & Finlay (2010) argue that such claims give rise to felicitous insensitive assessments for much the same pragmatic reasons that
we have argued applies to might-claims. Since people often ask what
they ought to do under conditions of uncertainty, the concerns behind
ought-claims frequently relate to limited bodies of information. Moreover, the purpose of such claims, like that of might-claims, is to guide
strategies for dealing appropriately with uncertainty, allowing us to
take into considerations both risks and promises. In the previous section, we suggested that for this purpose it is pointless to assess propositions relating to bodies of information that exclude accessible relevant
information. It was this pragmatic privileging of propositions that take
more information into account that favoured insensitive assessments.
Björnsson and Finlay make the same argument for ought propositions.
Conditionals: The considerations at work in the case of might-claims
also seem to be at play in the case of conditionals, where Brian Weatherson (2009) has recently argued for an assessor-relativistic analysis.
One of the striking features of indicative conditionals is that people
in different epistemic circumstances can be fully justified in accepting
conditionals that are, in a way, conflicting. Suppose that, unknown to
each other, Aaron and Basil are both trying to locate a treasure. Both
know that it is in one of three chests, A, B and C, spread out on a tropical island. Aaron has located C and, looking through a hole in its lid,
concluded that it is empty. He says to himself:
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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(54) If the treasure isn’t in A, it’s in B.
At the same time, Basil located B, finding it empty. He says to himself:
(55) If the treasure isn’t in A, it’s in C.
It is clear that Aaron and Basil are perfectly justified in making their
respective claims, given the information they have. Moreover, their
lack of further information does not seem to in any way undermine
their claims.31 This strongly suggests that speaker concerns in making
conditional claims are relative to their epistemic contexts.
A number of people have suggested contextualist analyses to account for this, analyses according to which the truth-conditions of indicative conditionals depend on what bodies of information are relevant in the context of utterance.32 As Brian Weatherson has pointed
out, however, it seems that two people can agree that if P, Q without
first making sure that they have the same information in mind (Weatherson 2009, 349–351; cf. Bennett 2003, ch. 6). Suppose, for example,
that Curly, the pirate that hid the treasure, knows that she put it in a
chest marked either ‘A’ or ‘B’ but that she cannot tell which because the
letter was partially covered in dust. Suppose further that Curly hears
Aaron utter (54): ‘If the treasure isn’t in A, it’s in B.’ It now seems that
Curly is in a position to reply
(56) That’s true.
even though she has no clear idea what information Aaron was relating
to when uttering his conditional. Since Aaron’s concern in uttering
(54) was relative to his epistemic position, (56) would be insensitive
to that concern.33
Weatherson takes this to support an assessor-relativistic account,
but our question is whether the pragmatic explanations proposed thus
far extends to (56) and other insensitive assessments of indicative conditionals. It seems that they do. Simplifying somewhat, the overall
purpose of conditional claims (of the sort we are concerned with) is to
guide hypothetical reasoning, primarily inferences from P to Q, secondarily from ∼Q to ∼P. Both Aaron and Curly have information which
guarantees that inferring that the treasure is in B given that it is not in A
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or inferring that it is in A given that it is not in B will yield true conclusions. Relative to the purpose of guiding such inferences, differences
in bodies of information that support the inferences will typically be
relatively insignificant. If what Curly knows guarantees that her inferences would be truth-preserving, it also guarantees that Aaron’s would
be. Consequently, for Curly to convey that she has such knowledge
is highly relevant for Aaron’s inferential concerns, giving further support to his inferential disposition, whereas determining whether Aaron
really has such knowledge is less likely to be helpful.
These considerations seem to match those at work in the case of
taste- and might-claims. Moreover, their role seems confirmed as their
absence favours sensitive assessments. Suppose that Aaron and Basil
are participants in a televised game show where the host, Drusilla,
knows what information they have, and also that the treasure is in fact
in A. She would not herself think that if the treasure is not in A it is in
B, nor that if it is not in A it is in C; if anything, she would be inclined
to think that if the treasure is not in A after all, some executive must
have taken off with it: this is the inference supported by the body of
information that is relevant for her inferential concerns.34 Nevertheless, it is easy to see how she can be in a position to either confirm the
participants’ reasoning (‘Yes Aaron, if it’s not in A, it’s in B’) or use factives to explain their actions to the viewers (‘Basil’s strategy changed
when he realized that if the treasure is not in A, it’s in C’). At least at a
first glance, then, insensitive assessments of conditionals seem to have
pragmatic explanations similar to those pertaining to assessments of
might-claims.

approximation to the extreme. Generally speaking, when it is said that
someone is rich, it seems that the speaker is concerned to express a
proposition to the effect that the person is above a certain cut-off point
on a scale of richness determined by a relevant comparison class. As
Mark Richard (2003; 2008) has pointed out, however, intuitions about
disagreement seem to be somewhat insensitive to these concerns. Suppose Mary has won a million dollar lottery. Didi is impressed and tells
a friend:

Gradable adjectives: The next class of expressions that seem to allow
for insensitive assessments and thus invite assessor-relativistic analyses is that of adjectives that have comparative and superlative forms:
‘rich’, ‘long’, ‘dirty’, ‘big’, etc. Such adjectives can be used to ascribe
quite different properties to objects in different contexts. For example,
the relevant comparison class clearly matters: thinking that someone is
rich for a kid is different from thinking that she is rich for a New Yorker,
say, and speakers might have different comparison classes in mind in
different contexts when they say that someone is rich. Less obviously,
speakers might require different degrees of deviation from the mean or

Richard thinks that this demands amendments to contextualist analyses of gradable adjectives, but he also provides the key ingredients for
a pragmatic explanation of this apparently insensitive assessment. Disagreements about the application of gradable adjectives seem to open
up for insensitive assessments in contexts where something hinges upon
where we put the cut-off. In the case at hand, Didi has her cut-off
points set such that those who count as rich have a wealth that impresses her, and the same goes for Naomi. Given this, judgments about
whether someone is rich becomes expressive of their attitudes in much
the same way that taste-judgments are. In another case, a disagreement about whether a shirt counts as dirty might have consequences
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(57) Mary’s rich.
In a different conversation, Naomi, who is not impressed, remarks:
(58) Mary won the lottery, but she still isn’t rich.
Suppose that ‘[e]ach conversation began with the observation that
some wealthy person doesn’t deserve to be rich, and each of the women
is now idly assessing people as rich or otherwise, and then assessing whether the rich ones deserve their wealth (Richard 2003, 218)’.
Suppose further that although both Didi and Naomi compared Mary’s
wealth to that of other New Yorkers, they differ in how well they think
that someone needs to do in this comparison to count as rich. If so,
they have different concerns when judging whether people are rich or
not. But as Richard says, we would nevertheless naturally think of
Mary and Didi as disagreeing about whether Mary is rich. If they were
part of the same conversation, it also seems that Naomi could naturally
respond to Didi by saying
(59) No, Mary’s not rich.
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for whether it goes to the dry cleaners or will still be worn (Richard
2003, 220).
When attitudes or practical concerns thus set the cut-off points for
gradable adjectives, a hearer’s sensitive agreements would leave one
important issue untouched: the hearer would not yet have expressed
her own attitude, or weighed in on whether the shirt has collected
enough dirt to go to the dry cleaners. Moreover, the hearer will seldom
be better placed than the speaker to determine whether the object in
question makes the speaker’s cut-off point; this makes the sensitive
assessment conversationally inappropriate. Since these pragmatic considerations are clearly analogous to those that we have argued are driving insensitive assessments of taste- and might-claims, it seems likely
that similar mechanisms are at work here.
If pragmatic considerations of the sort that explain insensitive assessments elsewhere extend to gradable adjectives, we should expect them
to extend to any term whose extension is to some extent determined
contextually in flexible ways. In the right context, we should expect
attitudes and practical concerns to determine the relevant extensions,
just as in the case of ‘rich’ and ‘dirty’, thus making insensitive assessments with the corresponding expressive or practical purpose conversationally relevant and sensitive assessments ignoring that purpose irrelevant. Moreover, we should typically expect hearers to know how those
concerns set the exact extension in particular uses of the term primarily
through its application. This creates a presumption of speaker authority when the application of the term depends on that exact setting, thus
making sensitive assessments conversationally inappropriate.
Since natural language displays a wide array of vagueness and indeterminacy that is resolved contextually, a great number of terms thus
have the potential to be subject to felicitous insensitive assessments, including most kind terms as well as terms like ‘here’ and ‘to the right’.
Compared to taste-claims, might-claims and conditionals, most other
claims are less strongly tied to specific conversational purposes that
can provide the relevant conversational constraints. We might thus
expect them to allow for insensitive assessments only in settings providing the relevant conversational purposes. But such settings do not
seem too hard to find. The following two exchanges, it seems to us,
can be naturally understood to involve insensitive assessments, where
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speaker and assessor understand ‘boy’ and ‘here’ differently:
(60) A: He is a boy!
(61) B: No, he is not. He is old enough to take responsibility for his
actions.
(62) C to D: And you know the Hendersons; they live here too!
(63) E to C and D: No they don’t, they live on the other side of the
tracks. Big difference!
Finally, there are whole classes of expressions that we have not mentioned, and that seem to carry a strong presumption of practical conversational purpose: normative terms like ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘correct’ and
‘incorrect’, evaluatives like ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘awesome’ and ‘disastrous’, and
more generally terms with positive or negative connotations. If these
terms relate flexibly to different standards or goals in different contexts, we should expect them too to give rise to insensitive assessments.
If this is correct, it would be of considerable importance for metaethics,
where it is often held against contextualist accounts of normative and
evaluative claims that people do not display sensitivity to differences in
speaker concerns when assessing such claims. Given the sort of explanations we have proposed for insensitive assessments, however, such
insensitivity might be just what we should expect.35
14. INSENSITIVE ASSESSMENTS: PRAGMATICS OR SEMANTICS

In this paper, we have argued that taste- and might-judgments allow for
and sometimes require felicitous insensitive assessments, that felicitous
insensitive assessments are puzzling, and that three ways of making
room for such assessments—assessor-relativistic analyses, cloudy contextualism and C-ASSESSMENT—do very little in themselves to solve
the puzzle. We have also argued that there are plausible pragmatic
explanations of why certain expressions invite insensitive assessments.
Pragmatic factors are without doubt at work when assessments of attitude reports either target the propositional objects of attitudes rather
than the reports themselves or express corresponding attitudes of the
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assessor, and we have shown how manipulation of significant pragmatic factors affect the availability of insensitive assessments of both
taste-claims and epistemic modals. Finally, we have suggested that
these explanations extend to other areas where insensitive assessments
have been thought to raise problems for contextualist analyses. Before
closing, we want to suggest that if these explanations are correct, insensitive assessments are best understood, not in terms of targets of
such assessments having assessor-relative truth-conditions or putting
in play clouds of propositions, but in terms of the pragmatics of assessments.
Here is the argument, in brief. First of all, everyone needs to account for production and uptake of sentences using various locutions:
everyone needs an account of why speakers use certain words for certain communicative purposes, and a corresponding account of how
hearers understand their utterances. The existence of felicitous insensitive assessments does not in any straightforward way suggest that
otherwise tempting contextualist analyses are incapable of filling this
role, as such assessments occur after the hearer has understood the utterance. Second, although it could have been that in order for these
further acts to be intelligible, the truth-conditions of the target utterances would have to be assessor-relative, the pragmatic explanations
provided here suggest that no such assessor-relativism is needed. What
is needed, it seems, is merely (a) that language lets assessments of beliefs or utterances target propositions other than those judged true by
the believer or expressed by the speaker, and (b) that pragmatic considerations make sensitive assessments conversationally inappropriate
while making insensitive assessments relevant. Finally, we have seen
no real evidence suggesting that the utterance must somehow have
‘put in play’ the proposition targeted by the insensitive assessment.
On the contrary, Felicia might have understood full well that Eduardo
expressed a proposition concerned with his taste, not with hers, and
would nevertheless be in a position to make felicitous insensitive assessments. The conservative assumption at this stage, therefore, is
that felicitous insensitive assessments are accounted for by familiar
contextualist analyses tracking (publicly manifest) speaker concerns,
C-ASSESSMENT, and the pragmatics of assessments.

www.thebalticyearbook.org

THE PRAGMATICS OF INSENSITIVE ASSESSMENTS

40

Notes
1
We thank audiences in Stockholm, Lisbon, London, Aberdeen, Riga and Oslo for
valuable comments on talks based on earlier versions of this paper, with a special mention of Barry Smith, Derek Ball and Nick Allott. Thanks also to two anonymous reviewers
for prompting a number of useful clarifications. Finally, Steve Finlay’s collaboration with
one of us (Björnsson) on related issues in Björnsson & Finlay (2010) while we were
working on this paper has sharpened our thinking about the issues in more ways than
we can count.
2
The analysis is partial because it does not tell us how to generalize to questions, embedded occurrences of ‘X is tasty’ or explicitly relativized taste-claims (‘X is tasty to Y’).
We stick to this partial analysis as our focus will be on unembedded, unqualified cases,
and as it lets us stay neutral between views taking the relevant standard to be part of
the semantic content of the utterance, those taking it to be part of the circumstances of
evaluation (what MacFarlane (2009) calls ‘non-indexical contextualism’), and those taking it to be a pragmatically implied content (cf. Bach 2011). One might have different
views about what makes a standard of taste relevant in the context of utterance: speaker
intentions, publicly manifested speaker intentions, accessibility of interpretations given
what is at issue in the context, and so forth. Any full analysis of ‘tasty’ will have to
take a stance on this, but our concern here is not to provide such an analysis: the phenomenon that concerns us is a puzzling mismatch in speaker and assessor concerns, and
this phenomenon remains whether or not the semantics of taste-claims is determined by
speaker intentions. Moreover, the examples of felicitous insensitive assessments that we
will consider are meant to be ones where these things coincide: speaker intentions and
concerns are publicly accessible and relevant to the issue in the context. Notice, though,
that contextualist analyses should not take the relevant form of contextual determination of standards of taste to closely match that of paradigmatic indexicals. Consider the
following dialogue involving the indexical ‘here’, which seems perfectly natural when
A and B are in different places: A: ‘They are here.’ B: ? ‘Yes, but they are not here;
that’s the problem.’ Contrast this with: A: ‘They are tasty.’ B: ‘Yes, but they are not
tasty: that’s the problem.’ B’s reply strikes us as contradictory, but it wouldn’t be if ‘yes’
denied A’s statement and B’s ‘tasty’ related to a different standard of taste than that of
A’s. However, ‘tasty’ is not alone among contextually sensitive expressions to depart from
the pattern of paradigmatic indexicals. Consider, for example, a dialogue involving ‘X is
early’, which seems to express that X is early in relation to some contextually relevant
time: A: ‘John is early.’ B: ‘Yes, but he isn’t early; that’s the problem.’ Apparently, ‘early’,
like ‘tasty’, resists changes of contextually determined parameter within one utterance
in a way that ‘here’ does not. In this paper, we focus on speaker concerns, but there
are other sources of evidence for contextualism. Schaffer (2011) argues that ‘tasty’ and
‘fun’ are two-place predicates making covert reference to an experiencer, appealing to
binding (‘everyonei got something tasty [to xi ]’), control of subjects of infinitival clauses
(‘It is fun [for xi ] [PROi to dance]’), and limitations on collection (‘Lisa and Homer have
agreed that Mousehead is tasty’ does not seem natural in all cases where both Lisa and
Homer have both sincerely uttered ‘Mousehead is tasty’ with co-referential instances of
‘Mousehead’). For related evidence, see Stephenson (2007: 489–491) on the behaviour
of epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste in attitude reports. We do not take a
stand here on whether assessor-relativist accounts of the sort discussed later can account
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for this evidence, or whether this sort of argument over-generalizes.
3
For arguments that there are felicitous insensitive assessments of judgments of personal taste, see Lasersohn (2005), Stephenson (2007) and MacFarlane (ms) ch. 1.
4
These reactions might seem to suggest that, unlike ‘false’ and ‘mistaken’, ‘no’ and ‘yes’
in (3) and (4) are not explicitly semantic assessments. Perhaps, then, felicitous semantic
assessments are still sensitive? This suggestion, however, fails to explain the infelicity of
(5) (which contains ‘you are right’) or with the fact that the following might be perfectly
fine as a reply to (2): ‘That’s true, but they didn’t look very appetizing.’ Here, we have
an explicitly semantic assessment, and one that is as naturally taken to be based on the
assessor’s as on Eduardo’s taste.
5
Like TASTY-C, MIGHT-C is only a partial analysis, and one that runs roughshod over
different versions of contextualism. See note 2. Furthermore, ‘body of information’ is too
restrictive, as might-claims can relate to sets of hypothetically entertained propositions.
But it covers the cases discussed here. Schaffer (2011) provides what he takes to be
evidence that epistemic ‘might’ has a hidden variable, analogous to what he provides for
‘tasty’. Dowell (2011) looks at some of the variation in might-claims that can be accommodated given a suitably flexible understanding of what makes a body of information
relevant.
6
This example is an adaption of the central case in von Fintel & Gillies (2011), which
they use for essentially the same purpose. Similar examples can also be provided for
epistemic adverbs like ‘perhaps’ and ‘maybe’.
7
See Dowell (2011), §3.
8
Like Lost keys, this example comes almost verbatim from von Fintel & Gillies (2011),
§4. Dowell (2011, §3) discusses what corresponds to Alice’s remark and thinks that she
can explain why it seems appropriate, but the immediate trouble for the hypothesis that
people understand (10) as a communal claim comes from the intuitive inappropriateness of the question in (18): it should not be seen as inappropriate under a communal
interpretation of (10).
9
Obviously, the question would not assert that the keys being in the car is compatible
with what Alice knows, but it would pragmatically imply it.
10
Kent Bach (2011, §5) agrees that we sometimes assess might-claims from perspectives other than those relative to which the claims were made. Instead, he rejects the
intuition that such assessments are felicitous, arguing that they are based on a mistake
about what proposition is expressed by the original utterance. As we have argued here,
however, it seems that people are intuitively clear that Alice’s concern in making the
judgment is with a solipsistic proposition, that is, with where the keys might be given information available to her. One way to avoid problems with possible communal readings
of assessed might-judgments is to make sure that the assessor is not part of the conversation in which the judgment was made. We have avoided leaning on such ‘eavesdropping’
cases, partly because they tend to elicit less solid intuitions than cases like Lost Keys and
partly for reasons of space. But we think that there are plausible cases of the relevant
sort. Consider, for example: ‘They say Smith left town, but I’ve asked around. According
to Joe, the Chang brothers too are looking for Smith, and they seem to think that he
might be hiding downtown as they have sent some people down there looking for him.
I think they’re right that he might be downtown, as he has previously been reluctant to
leave home turf, but he might also have left.’ The assessment here (‘I think they’re right’)
sounds natural though it seems unlikely that the speaker and the Chang brothers are
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relating to the same informational base.
11
Obviously, speakers and hearers are often at cross-purposes in a variety of ways,
but the coincidence of interests that we have in mind here is merely a coincidence in the
conditions that the speaker hopes to have gotten right in making the judgment expressed
and the condition the hearer is trying to assess the satisfaction of in cases of apparently
open, sincere, and unconfused communication.
12
To say that not assessing whether the condition obtains requires effort is not of course
to say that effort is required not to reach a definite judgment, for assessment are often
inconclusive. However, if the information needed for a definite positive or negative
assessment is immediately available, we should expect a judgment in the absence of an
effort to prevent this.
13
We have characterized contextualism and assessor-relativism solely in terms of truth–
conditions (of utterances, beliefs, judgments, etc) while most of the current debate over
contextualism and relativism employs the Kaplanesque distinction between propositional
content and circumstances of evaluation. As indicated in footnotes 2 and 5, we hope to
be able to ignore a number of semi-technical side issues by using the less fine grained
notion of truth-conditions of utterances.
14
We are not saying that S-ASSESSMENT has been an explicit premise in most arguments against contextualism and for assessor-relativistic alternatives, but we do suggest
that something like it is implicitly taken for granted in many arguments. Suitably flexible forms of assessor-relativism for ‘tasty’ and ‘might’ will allow that we sometimes assess
utterances relative to standards of taste other than our own, or to bodies of information
other than those available to us at the time of assessment. However, to account for insensitive assessments, the conventionally indicated default must be to go by standards
of taste of assessors and information available to assessors, respectively.
15
There are also numerous ways in which simple forms of assessor-relativism gets the
evidence wrong: for some, see von Fintel & Gillies (2008). For an approach that avoids
some such problems, see Stephenson (2007).
16
In this case and in most others, felicitous insensitive assessments target propositions
that the sentence would have expressed relative to a different context than the actual
context of utterance. However, as we shall see in the next section, we take C-ASSESSMENT to have a wider scope than that.
17
We thank an anonymous referee for raising this worry.
18
The approach was briefly sketched in Almér & Björnsson (2009) and developed in
detail for practical ‘ought’-judgments in Björnsson & Finlay (2010).
19
von Fintel and Gillies (2008, 81–84) appeal to cases like these to cast doubts on
certain attributions of (what we call) insensitive assessments, thereby undermining the
sort of assessor-relativism advocated by MacFarlane (2011; ms).
20
We borrow Vinnie from Cappelen & Hawthorne (2009), 115–116, e.g..
21
‘Looks’ is included to remove speaker authority. Notice that the parent’s reply, although sensitive to Dana’s standard of taste, is insensitive to ‘looks’ much as felicitous
assessments of ‘I wonder if P’ tend to be insensitive to the speaker’s expressed epistemic
attitude towards P.
22
Further cases prompting sensitive assessments are easily generated on the pattern of
the cases discussed in section 12, cases prompting sensitive assessments through the use
of questions, explanations of behaviour and factives. Moreover, examples can easily be
generated where insensitive assessments seem inappropriate: We, to Vinnie the Vulture:

Vol. 6: Formal Semantics and Pragmatics: Discourse, Context, and Models

43

Gunnar Björnsson & Alexander Almér

‘Vinnie, this should be really tasty, the rot has really set in.’ John: ‘No, it’s not tasty, it’s
disgusting.’ We: ‘John, we are talking about what is tasty to Vinnie.’
23
We thank Derek Ball for focussing our attention on the issue of implicatures.
24
Different people might attach accusatory connotations of different strengths to different expressions. We expect ‘that’s not true’ to be slightly less accusatory and thus more
compatible with felicitous insensitive assessments than ‘that’s false.’ Nearly all proposed
examples of insensitive assessments in the literature use ‘no’ for expressions of negative
assessments or rejections, with some occasional uses of ‘Nuh-uh’ (Stephenson 2007) and
the occasional ‘not true’. One exception is MacFarlane (2011).
25
The claim here is not that this is the essence of real disagreement. What we think is
merely that it captures the bases for some intuitions about disagreement that have figured in the debate. For certain purposes, it might make sense to say that disagreement
proper involves disagreement about the truth of a proposition with monadic truth-conditions.
26
The more ambitious answer, and one that has famously tempted a number of people
of different theoretical stripes, adopts these abstractions—‘propositions’ that are true
or false only relative to, say, assessors’ standards of taste—as basic building blocks in
semantic theory (e.g. Kölbel 2004, MacFarlane 2005, 2007; Egan 2007; Lasersohn 2005,
Stephenson 2007 and Brogaard 2008). Obviously, Kaplanesque semantics already takes
propositions to be true or false relative to times and worlds; these proposals want to add
further parameters for judges, standards of taste or similar. For criticism of various forms
of relativistic semantics, see e.g. Cappelen & Hawthorne (2009). We would prefer being
liberal about the issue, allowing different theoretical building blocks for different parts
of semantic theory or different explanatory needs, but there is no need for us to take a
stand here.
27
Bach (2011), §5 also appeals to the pragmatic priority of might-propositions relating
to more expansive bodies of information in explaining insensitive assessments.
28
Stephenson (2007, 511–512) discusses a similar case and denies that a might-claim
like that made by the host in (52) is best understood as relating to addressee’s information, because a paraphrase of might P as ‘you don’t know if P’ renders the resulting
utterance unnatural. However, this paraphrase is quite loose, and the stricter ‘you cannot
rule out that P’ results in a perfectly appropriate utterance.
29
Both Bach (2011, §6) and von Fintel and Gillies (2008, 93–94) employ ‘realize’ to
illustrate sensitive assessments of might judgments.
30
There are some fairly subtle differences. One is that might-judgments seem to leave
more room for errors in reasoning than do most taste-judgments, thus allowing more
easily for assessments with accusatory implications: ‘I was wrong’, ‘you are mistaken’,
and so forth. Another is that might-judgments embed propositions that become possible
targets of assessments, just as propositions embedded in attributions of propositional
attitudes often are. When Alice says ‘The keys might be in the car’ and Beth replies ‘No,
I had them when I came in’, Beth’s ‘no’ might be understood as rejecting the proposition
that the keys are in the car as well as the proposition that they might be there (von Fintel
& Gillies 2008, 82–84). (Since both rejections would contribute to the task at hand
and since both would rest on the same considerations, ’No’ is most likely understood to
express both.)
31
The phenomenon was identified by Allan Gibbard 1981.
32
See e.g. Stalnaker (1981); Weatherson (2001): Nolan (2003); and Björnsson (2011:
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§5.6). For brevity, we ignore differences in views about how the relevant bodies of information are selected, yielding corresponding differences in how ‘objective’ conditionals
are.
33
Weatherson focuses on agreement, but one might also want to say that Curly is in
a position to disagree with Basil, and respond to his utterance with ‘No, if it isn’t in A,
it won’t be in C’ or ‘That’s wrong, it can’t be in C.’ However, since intuitions about the
latter might be clouded by accusatory connotations, and it is somewhat unclear whether
‘No’ in the former really targets the full utterance rather than the consequent, this makes
for a less clean case.
34
In the case where inferences from ∼A are concerned, A or assumptions relying on A
will not be part of that body of information.
35
Björnsson and Finlay (2011, 25–36) argue that the explanation for insensitive assessments of moral ought-judgments relating to bodies of information other than those
of the assessor extends to ought-judgments relating to different moral standards than
those endorsed by the assessor. They develop their pragmatic explanation against the
background assumption that people with sufficiently different moral views have different propositions in mind when they make moral judgments. This is obviously denied
by moral objectivists, but we think that arguments for moral objectivism are weak. See
e.g. Tersman (2006), Björnsson (ms). For the best developed contextualist analysis of
normative and evaluative terms that we are familiar with, see Finlay (ms).
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